Reactor Safety
Significance Determination Process
Examples

Row	Approx. Freq.	Example Event Type	Estimated Likelihood Rating		
I	>1 per 1 - 10 yr	Reactor Trip Loss of Power Conv. Sys. (loss of condensor, closure of MSIVs, loss of feedwater)	A	B	C
II	1 per 10 - 10^2 yr	Loss of Offsite Power Small LOCA (BWR) (Stuck open SRV only) MSLB (outside cntmt)	B	C	D
III	1 per 10^2 - 10^3 yr	SGTR Stuck open PORV (PWR) Small LOCA (PWR) (RCP seal failures and stuck open SVs only) MFLB MSLB (inside PWR cntmt)	C	D	E
IV	1 per 10^3 - 10^4 yr	Small LOCA (pipe breaks) ATWS-PWR (elect only)	D	E	F
V	1 per 10^4 - 10^5 yr	Med LOCA* Large LOCA ~~(BWR)~~* ATWS-BWR	E	F	G
VI	<1 per 10^5 yr	~~Large LOCA (PWR)~~* ATWS-PWR (mech only) ISLOCA Vessel Rupture	F	G	H
			> 30 days	30-3days	<3 days
			Exposure Time for Degraded Condition		

* Pending Change

Table 1 - Estimated Likelihood for Initiating Event Occurrence During Degraded Period

(Rev 6/10/99)

Initiating Event Likelihood	Remaining Mitigation Capability Rating (with Examples)						
	6	**5**	**4**	**3**	**2**	**1**	**0**
	3 diverse trains OR 2 multi-train systems OR 1 train + 1 multi-train system + recovery of failed train	1 train + 1 multi-train system OR 2 diverse trains + recovery of failed train	2 diverse trains OR 1 multi-train system + recovery of failed train	1 train + recovery of failed train OR 1 multi-train system OR Operator action + recovery of failed train	1 train OR Operator action OR Operator action under high stress + recovery of failed train	Recovery of failed train OR Operator action under high stress	none
A	Green	White	Yellow	Red	Red	Red	Red
B	Green	Green	White	Yellow	Red	Red	Red
C	Green	Green	Green	White	Yellow	Red	Red
D	Green	Green	Green	Green	White	Yellow	Red
E	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	White	Yellow
F	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	White
G	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
H	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green

Table 2 - Risk Significance Estimation Matrix (rev 6/10/99)

Type of Remaining Capability	Remaining Capability Rating
Operator Action Under High Stress Definition: Operator action assumed to have about a 1E-1 probability of failing when credited as "remaining mitigation capability".	1
Recovery of Failed Train Definition: Operator action to recover failed equipment that is capable of being recovered after an initiating event occurs that requires the equipment (e.g., equipment was unavailable due to a switch misalignment). Action may take place either in the control room or outside the control room and is assumed to have about a 1E-1 probability of failing when credited as "remaining mitigation capability".	1
1 Automatic Steam-Driven (ASD) Train Definition: A collection of associated equipment that includes a single turbine-driven component to provide 100% of a specified safety function. The probability of such a train being unavailable due to failure, test, or maintenance is assumed to be about 1E-1 when credited as "remaining mitigation capability".	1
Operator Action Definition: Operator action that can occur with sufficient time to have about a 1E-2 probability of failing when credited as "remaining mitigation capability".	2
1 Train (diverse as compared to other trains) Definition: A collection of associated equipment (e.g., pumps, valves, breakers, etc.) that together can provide 100% of a specified safety function and for which the probability of being unavailable due to failure, test, or maintenance is assumed to be about 1E-2 when credited as "remaining mitigation capability". Two or more trains are diverse if they are not considered to be susceptible to common cause failure modes.	2
1 Multi-Train System Definition: A system comprised of two or more trains (as defined above) that are considered susceptible to common cause failure modes. Such a system is assumed to have about a 1E-3 probability of being unavailable, regardless of how many trains comprise the system, when credited as "remaining mitigation capability".	3
2 (diverse) Trains [adding example] (2 diverse trains are assumed to have a combined 1E-4 probability of being unavailable)	4 (= 2 + 2)
1 Train + Recovery of Failed Train [adding example] (1 train plus recovery of failed train is assumed to have a combined 1E-3 probability of being unavailable or failed)	3 (=2 + 1)

Table 3 - Remaining Capability Rating Values

Rev. 11/5/99